

Religious Freedom in the World

*A Global Comparative Survey
Sponsored by Freedom House*

Editor's note:

Thomas Jefferson was a man of many accomplishments, including being president, secretary of state, governor of Virginia, and ambassador to France. But when he composed his own epitaph for his tombstone, Jefferson asked that only three items be included: that he was author of the Declaration of Independence, founder of the University of Virginia, and that he wrote the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom. That statute, which took Jefferson and others of like mind nine years to convince the Virginia legislature to pass, reads in part:

“We the General Assembly of Virginia do enact that no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened in his body or goods, or shall otherwise suffer, on account of his religious opinions or beliefs.”

Religious freedom holds a special place in the history of the United States. From the earliest days of this country, countless immigrants have come to our shores to escape religious persecution. Many did so at the risk of life and limb. We continue today to be graced by what Jefferson called “freedom of conscience.”

Not all people in the world are so fortunate. This past fall, the human rights organization Freedom House—which has a long pedigree of monitoring political rights and civil liberties—published the first comparative global survey of religious freedom ever compiled. The report, entitled *Religious Freedom in the World: A Global Survey of Freedom and Persecution*, provides profiles of the state of religious freedom in seventy-five nations representing 90 percent of the world's population.

The survey's editor, Dr. Paul Marshall, recently described the major findings:

“Worldwide, religious freedom is deteriorating. A




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


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Opposite page: Women pray during the celebration of Little Saint Mary at an old church in the village of Rozavlea, Romania. Above, from left to right: Lobsang Dolma, Tibetan nun; Wailing Wall, Jerusalem; Choirboys singing, Varanasi, India; Men praying in a mosque in Karaganda, Kazakhstan.






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Above: Caodai sect worshippers praying in Tay Ninh, Vietnam. Below: Young Masai Ladies Pentecostal service, Tanzania.



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


PHOTO © ATLAS GEOGRAPHIC

At left: Pentecostal woman in prayer, USA. Above: Christian boys praying in Urfâ, Turkey. Below: Pope John Paul II visits his homeland: Poland, June 8, 1987.



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world is a difficult thing to summarize, but the trend shows that repression of religious minorities is widespread in countries with large populations, such as China, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Sudan, and Nigeria, and that religion is increasingly a key element of modern wars in the Balkans, Israel, Chechnya, and Kashmir.

“While overall the situation is worse, however, there is also good news. Latin America has become one of the most religiously free areas in the world. And, except for the former Yugoslavia, the countries of Eastern Europe have also become largely free. One great story of the last quarter century is the victory of free-

dom in the traditionally Catholic world. There are also many free countries in Africa, especially in the south, while several smaller Asian countries are also free. Nevertheless, the dominant pattern in the world is the increasing political influence of religion coupled with increasing religious repression.”

Drawing on Freedom House’s half century of expertise in surveys of democracy, human rights, economic freedom, and press freedom, *Religious Freedom in the World* is the product of a multi-disciplinary and multi-religious group of more than sixty scholars from the U.S. and abroad. In addition to the seventy-five country profiles, the report includes regional surveys, background essays on religious freedom, and charts





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Above: Holy Kaaba pilgrims in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. Below: Schoolgirls pray at the funeral of a classmate, Java, Indonesia. At Right: Hindu girl praying at Diwali Festival. Below right: Cuban woman kneels before a small shrine.



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


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that summarize the findings by geographic area and by religious background. Each nation is given a religious freedom rating from one to seven, with one denoting “free” and seven denoting “unfree.”

In the pages that follow, we have reprinted the chart, “Religious Freedom by Area,” and four of the country profiles: Russia, because it remains an important country and because it is interesting to see what is happening in that nation’s troubled post-Communist era; India, also because of its size and importance but also because of the worsening conditions there; North Korea, because it presents a rather pure view of what happens to religious liberty under Communist totalitarianism; and Sudan—the largest country in Africa—where it is estimated that two million people have been killed as part

of a brutal pattern of religious persecution over the past twenty years. China, one of the world’s worst religious persecutors, is not included because the situation there tends to be covered in some detail by the mainstream press.

The criteria used by Freedom House to judge countries were developed from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, the European Convention on Human Rights, and from a list of criteria developed by Willy Fautre, the head of Human Rights without Frontiers in Brussels. The authors of the report are careful to point out that (1) The ratings are based on “the situation in countries, not the conduct of governments. In some cases, such as

Religious Freedom by Area

Religious Freedom Rating	Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe	North Africa and West Asia	Western Europe and North Atlantic	Asia	Africa	Latin America
1	Estonia		Finland Ireland Netherlands Norway United States			
2	Lithuania Poland		Austria Sweden United Kingdom	Japan South Korea Taiwan	Botswana Namibia South Africa	Brazil
3	Hungary Latvia Romania Ukraine	Israel	Belgium France Germany Spain	Mongolia Philippines	Zimbabwe	Argentina Chile El Salvador Guatemala
4	Armenia Bulgaria Georgia Kazakhstan Kyrgystan Macedonia Moldova Russia	Greece Lebanon Morocco		Malaysia Singapore Sri Lanka	Tanzania	Colombia Mexico
5	Azerbaijan Belarus	Egypt Turkey		East Timor India Indonesia Nepal	Nigeria	
6	Uzbekistan	Mauritania Pakistan		Bangladesh Bhutan China Vietnam		Cuba
7	Turkmenistan	Iran Saudi Arabia Sudan		Burma North Korea Tibet (China)		

“free”
 “partly free”
 “unfree”

in civil war, there may be little religious freedom, but a government may be able to do little about it"; (2) Freedom of religion includes the right not to be religious: "The persecution of all people of any or no religion should be equally as offensive in our eyes as that of believers in any particular religion"; and (3) "In line with most human rights treaties, this survey covers freedom of 'religion or belief.' There are beliefs that, functionally, take the place of explicitly religious beliefs, and these, too, should be protected."

Religious Freedom in the World, published by Broadman &

Holman Publishers, may be ordered through your local bookstore, or it is available online through the Freedom House website for \$16.99, including postage: www.freedom-house.org/religion.

Paul Marshall, the general editor of *Religious Freedom in the World* and the author of several background essays in the report, is a former professor of political philosophy at the University of Toronto and the author of *Their Blood Cries Out*. He currently is a senior fellow at Freedom House's Center for Religious Freedom.

Country Profiles

Russia

Population	146.5 million
Russian Orthodox	55%
Muslim	9%
Protestant (Baptist, Pentecostal)	1%
Shamanist/Animist	0.8%
Buddhist	0.6%
Roman Catholic	0.5%
New Religions (e.g., Hare Krishna)	0.5%
Jewish	0.4%
Old Believers	0.1%
Agnostics/Atheists/Other	32.1%

Religious Freedom Rating 4

The nine-hundred-year official Christian status of the Russian Empire was replaced in 1917 by an atheist ideology, which was not abandoned until the late 1980s, although it was enforced with varying degrees of severity. This was the first time in history that a state adopted the abolition of religion as official policy, and all the main political parties now abjure the former atheist policies.

In 1990, with a new religion law, the government of Mikhail Gorbachev established *de jure* the *de facto* religious liberty that had slowly emerged since 1986. Already at the celebration of the "Millennium of the Baptism of Rus" (June 1988), Gorbachev had personally sanctioned these new freedoms and encouraged the Russian Orthodox Church to plan public events, with full nationwide and international media coverage. Gorbachev forecast cooperation between Christians and Communists as one cornerstone of the new Soviet Union.

However, when the USSR collapsed three years later, the new law on religion was only a year old. In fact, there were two laws—one for the Soviet Union as a whole and one for the RSFSR (Russia). Both had repealed Stalin's 1929 Law on Religious Associations and embraced religious liberty in a form acceptable in any Western democracy. The Soviet government sought advice from Western lawyers in drafting this law. The most significant difference between the laws was that the Russian one allowed the teaching of religion in state schools. Internal church statutes, which previously could not conflict with state atheism, were also changed to conform to the new freedom. Particularly notable was the new statute

for the Russian Orthodox Church, promulgated at the "sobor" (church council) held to coincide with the millennium celebrations.

The role of religion in society changed in every essential aspect during these years. Very important was the abolition of the Council for Religious Affairs, the government body that officially acted as a "liaison" between church and state, but which, in fact, exercised atheist controls on religious life and took its orders from the KGB. At the same time, there were multiple incursions into Russia by all kinds of proselytizing groups. These groups included cults such as Aum Shinrikyo, implicated in nerve gas attacks in Tokyo, but also included many who sincerely wished to work with existing Russian religious groups.

The tens of thousands of now unemployed atheist lecturers and government operatives (*upolnomochennye*) throughout Russia's eighty-nine administrative divisions were discontented and soon worked to reestablish some form of government control over religion throughout the regions. They found it difficult to accept that the new Russia could permit religion to proliferate without even the requirement of registration. As early as 1993, there were discussions about establishing an "Experts' Council" on religion to investigate—not whether—but *how* the government could impose order on the apparent chaos brought about by religious freedom. Various drafts of a new law were mooted at different parliamentary levels, culminating in a long, detailed, and discriminatory new law passed in September 1997. More than twenty-five regions had earlier introduced their own local legislation, all of it variously restrictive, but with no two identical and none in complete conformity with Duma legislation. Nor were these regional laws abolished when the federal one came into being. To add further contradictions, the new Russian Constitution of 1993 guarantees freedom of conscience to all citizens, in conformity with the international agreements to which Russia is signatory.

The imposition of new legislation is so uneven, and sometimes ignored, that much more religious freedom exists than the letter of the law implies. In the current administrative chaos, the law, in effect, signals to distant officials that they have *carte blanche* to act as they wish, without laws or bodies to which they are in practice answerable. On the ground the situation is different in every one of the eighty-nine regions, varying from almost complete religious liberty

in Sakha (Yakutia) to considerable controls in Moscow or Khakassia.

The Moscow Patriarchate, the administrative center of the Russian Orthodox Church, had an active hand in drafting the 1997 bill and lobbying senior government officials to pass it. Both President Clinton and Pope John Paul II intervened with President Yeltsin, who asked the drafting committee to modify it. This was not satisfactorily done, but Yeltsin received assurances that it had been and signed it anyway. All this occurred during the summer holiday period, with no discussion in the press, and no adequate consultation with the bodies most affected—the representatives of the Protestant and Catholic churches.

The purpose of the law, as stated by the Orthodox Church, is expressly to control “sectarian” groups, particularly those funded from the outside and promoted by foreign nationals. However, it can in practice be used as a tool against religion in general. If the Communist Party were reestablished and it renounced its positive view of religion, the legal tool is already at hand to begin another atheist campaign.

All religions, including the Orthodox Church, are paradoxically constrained to restrict their mission and educational work to their existing membership. By contrast, every atheist or secular group has the right to propagate its beliefs within society as a whole. There is a distinction between religious organizations (recognized churches) and “religious groups.” Only the former can enjoy tax privileges, have their clergy exempt from military service, set up educational institutions, or receive state subsidies for the restoration of historic buildings.

Within the “religious groups” there is further discrimination. Those that cannot produce documentation to prove their registered existence fifteen years ago must re-register every year for fifteen years and obey every state requirement as a condition of achieving legal status eventually. This makes 1982, the end of the Brezhnev era, when religion was severely repressed, the benchmark. Some groups, such as Jehovah’s Witnesses, Eastern-Rite Catholics, and Methodists (on Russian soil, not in Estonia) were completely illegal at the time; others, such as Pentecostals, Adventists, some Baptist groups, and even the mainstream Catholics, existed in a penumbra between legality and illegality, the unwritten or secret restrictions being applied in arbitrary ways in different parts of the Soviet Union. In the interim, until 2012, these groups may not own, rent, or hire property; or publish, print, import, or distribute religious literature, even for their own worship. They may not open educational institutions or make provision for training their leadership; they may not invite foreigners to preach or work alongside them or conduct services of worship or public prayer in hospitals, orphanages, prisons, or mental institutions. At the end of 1999, Putin extended the deadline for registration for one year, but threatened that those groups not registered by then would be “liquidated.”

Most seriously affected by these provisions are those groups that refused cooperation with the old regime and refused to apply for registration on the grounds that this was in itself a restriction on religious liberty. Paradoxically, there-

The future of religious liberty in Russia depends on the development of a democratic and peaceful society.

fore, those that historically stood strongest for religious freedom are now the most disadvantaged by the new legislation.

In practical, as distinct from legal, terms, there is tremendous variety across Russia’s vastness. In general, the gains since the Brezhnev era are immense. Teaching religion to children is possible in practice where teachers are available; most denominations—Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox—have their theological seminaries (in the latter case some thirty are now operative, as compared with two on Russian soil in 1980 and none for any other denomination). Printed literature is widely available, and imports continue. Churches are free to appoint their own pastors without state interference. Charitable work has developed from zero in 1980 to a nationwide network today. Much church property has been returned, and Orthodox churches are open virtually everywhere. For other groups the record is less good; for example, many Catholic churches are still in state hands, and the Orthodox Church has refused to return some churches to the Old Believers.

In law, there is theoretically less religious liberty today than in Gorbachev’s heyday, but the restrictions are carried out haphazardly and they affect minority groups more than the mainstream churches. Islam and Judaism receive named protection under the law as “traditional religions.”

Where there is physical violence, it is caused more by a breakdown in law and order than by state policy, as had occurred in Communist days. Two respected politicians, members of the Orthodox Church, were murdered in 1995 (Vitali Savitsky) and 1998 (Galina Starovoitova), but this seemed to result from their anticorruption activities rather than action specifically connected to their faith. The 1990 murder of Fr. Alexander Men, the apostle of the new deal for religion, was apparently an isolated incident (possibly revanchism by the KGB). Sanctions against individual Orthodox clergy for their criticism of the Moscow Patriarchate are internal church matters, unconnected with state interference. There has been considerable violence against such breakaway groups as the True Orthodox Church, including accusations that their clergy have been murdered for their stance.

In Chechnya, nominally Russian but, until the latest military assault, in practice virtually independent, all Russian Orthodox priests have been kidnapped or have fled. The two pastors of the Baptist church in Grozny, the capital, have been beheaded, and their successor kidnapped, and virtually all Protestants have fled.

Muslims cannot regain their mosque in Stavropol (a unique situation in today's Russia); Jehovah's Witnesses are fighting the removal of their registration in Moscow; the Perm administration is attempting to force registration on the local Pentecostal church; the Lutheran community in Khakassia was deprived of registration in 1998; few Catholic priests are ethnic Russians (no seminary education was available in the Communist period), while foreign priests are forced to leave the country every three months in order to renew their visas. In October 1998, Communist lawmaker Albert Makashov blamed the country's problems on *zhidy*, a derogatory term for Jews. Anti-Semitism is growing rapidly with bombings and attempted bombings of synagogues and physical attacks on Jewish leaders. The situation is in flux and the future of religious liberty in Russia depends not only on the future of the 1997 legislation but also on the development of a democratic and peaceful society with a less corrupt administration.



India

Population	986 million
Hindu	78%
Muslim (mostly Sunni)	12%
Christian	3%
Indigenous	2.5%
Sikh	2%
Buddhist	0.9%
Jain	0.5%
Parsi	0.3%
Baha'i	0.2%
Jewish	0.1%
Nonreligious	0.5%
Religious Freedom Rating	5

Apart from the ancient set of religions collectively known as Hinduism, several other world religions have also exerted considerable influence on India. Islam's influence began with the Arab contacts of the ninth century, followed by a succession of Muslim conquests, which have left their mark on Indian society. Christianity first came to India in the first century A.D. but long remained confined to the coastal area of Kerala. With the arrival of the Portuguese in the fifteenth century and the British in the eighteenth century, Christianity's influence increased.

The constitution describes India as "a sovereign socialist secular democratic republic." It also contains detailed provisions for religious rights for all citizens. The constitution also empowers the courts to declare invalid any law passed by the parliament or a state government that contravenes the constitution. Article 25 guarantees freedom of conscience, free profession and practice of religion, as well as the right to propagate religion. Article 28 states that no religious instruction shall be provided in any wholly state-funded establishment, and parental consent in other institutions is required. This constitutional provision is currently under threat as a

result of demands by Hindu nationalists for all schools in the country to conform to the concept of India as a Hindu nation. Article 30 guarantees religious minorities the right to establish and administer educational institutions. While minority institutions have enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy in the past, in recent years they have been increasingly subjected to restrictions and scrutiny, and there have been cases in which the courts have unjustly intervened in their internal affairs. Article 51 of the constitution also imposes a positive duty on citizens to promote harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood among all people of India transcending religious boundaries, but failure to abide by these provisions cannot be challenged in the courts.

Provision is made in the area of personal law for Hindu, Muslim, and Parsi communities. These personal law provisions are intended to safeguard religious liberty by providing for accepted religious differences. While, in 1965, the Indian government removed some of the anomalies of Hindu personal law, Muslim personal law remains strictly governed by the principles of *shari'a*. Among other disputes that have risen surrounding the issue of religious freedom for Muslims, an Allahbad High Court ruling in 1994 is significant: It states that unilateral divorce (*Talaq*) initiated by a Muslim husband is unconstitutional. This followed a ruling by the All-India Muslim Personal Law Board, which had upheld this provision as "a legitimate Islamic provision" for Muslim men. There is no separate personal law for Christians or the microscopic Jewish community. Under the 1869 Indian Divorce Act, Christian women are not usually entitled to seek divorce from their husbands even if they are mistreated. However, a court in Kerala State did allow a Christian woman to divorce her husband on the grounds of cruelty and desertion. Changes to the law have been proposed, but many Christians fear that these could become means of legal control.

Because of legal confusion over the status of religious personal law, matters affecting the religious freedom of minority groups are likely to remain unresolved until amendments are passed that clearly outline the rights and responsibilities obtained under different personal laws. In general, India—with its constitutional guarantees of religious freedom and its ambiguous provisions to protect sensitive religious feelings—can be called a moderate secular state and not a radically or avowedly secular one. As Dr. Radhakrishnan, the former president of India, noted, "Secularism is not a positive religion, or the state would assume divine prerogative. We hold that no religion should be given preferential treatment."

In reality, however, the religious freedom of Sikhs, Buddhists, and Jains, who are distinct religious communities, is not guaranteed under the constitution. Although, like other minorities, Sikhs, Buddhists, and Jains enjoy absolute freedom of worship and the freedom to establish and govern their own institutions, the government's refusal to recognize these three traditions as separate from Hinduism has been the subject of controversy. While Buddhist and Jain leaders have made fewer efforts to achieve separate constitutional recognition as religious entities distinct from Hinduism, Sikhs have strongly protested, and it is widely believed that

this helped give rise to the Sikh Separatist movement in Punjab State in the 1980s. This has caused considerable bloodshed, including the assassination of then prime minister Mrs. Gandhi in 1983 by two of her own Sikh security guards.

Similar controversy concerning the religious identity of the indigenous (*Adivasi*) people has arisen because of the Indian government's consistent refusal at the United Nations to recognize that the religion of its indigenous people is distinct from Hinduism. This has led to the formation of the Indian Council of Indigenous and Tribal People in 1987. Members of officially scheduled tribes are about 8 percent of the population.

In the last few years, India has witnessed a rise in Hindu nationalism and of militant groups such as the RSS (*Rashtriya Swayamseva*), Vishva Hunadu Parishad (VHP), Shiv Sena, Bajrang Dal, and the BJP (*Bharatiya Janata Party*). The rise of *Hindutva* has led to the coming to power of the BJP, the political wing of Hindu nationalism. This ideology encompasses the vision of India as a Hindu state in which minorities must assimilate to the majority culture and language, revere the Hindu religion, and glorify the Hindu "race" and culture. Meanwhile the Indian Supreme Court has held that there is no real legal content to the term "Hindu." In the run-up to fall 1999 national elections, the BJP has criticized Sonia Gandhi's foreign roots, and some of its supporters have complained that she is a "Christian" tool.

The presence of a substantial Muslim minority in India has always been perceived by radical Hindus as a threat to national unity because of the alleged potential loyalty of Muslims to Pakistan, which was formed as a separate land for Muslims in 1947. Although, since partition, Muslims have enjoyed freedom of worship, they often complain of discrimination in employment, education, and business. India has a long history of Hindu-Muslim riots, and thousands of people have lost their lives and property. Rising Hindu militancy and anti-Muslim sentiment resulted in the destruction of the sixteenth-century Babri mosque in Ayodha in 1992 by a Hindu mob, with the open support of the BJP state government. This destruction was followed by well-organized communal violence across the country, in which thousands of people were either killed or disappeared. This raised questions as to whether India will be able to remain a secular country or become a Hindu nation, particularly when the election slogan of some radical Hindu nationalists was "Muslims have only two abodes—Pakistan or the graveyard."

In recent years the smaller Christian minority has also become a scapegoat for many of the ills prevailing in Indian society. While Christians are generally regarded as peace loving, they are still perceived by Hindu nationalists to be loyal to a "foreign religion." Systematic antiminority propaganda, fueled by the hate speech of right-wing Hindu nationalists, has unleashed a recent campaign of terror against Christians, especially in Gujarat. Incidents of persecution of Christians include destruction of churches, burning of Bibles in schools, torture in police custody, mob violence to disrupt church services and Christian meetings, rape, and brutal murder. In early 1997, Father Thomas, a Jesuit priest from

Belgium and a Christian human rights activist, was brutally killed by militants disguised as police officers. Father Christudas was severely beaten and then paraded naked through the streets by Hindu fundamentalists, in full view of the police.

Since late 1998, the number of attacks has increased. In 1999, nationalists burned to death, along with his two sons, an Australian who worked with lepers. On June 22, India's Central Bureau of Investigation filed charges against eighteen men for this murder. The United Christian Forum for Christian Human Rights has released a document under the title *Open White Paper* detailing 113 reported incidents of attacks, including the rape of four nuns and the murders of twelve Christians by Hindu militants in the last two years. In March 1999, attacks on Christians in the state of Orissa left twelve hundred homeless. In September a Roman Catholic was killed by a mob in Orissa, and a nun was kidnapped in the eastern state of Bihar, while on October 2, a priest was killed in Orissa by Hindu fundamentalists. In November a Christian gathering in Delhi was attacked, and at least twelve people were injured. Muslim and Christian leaders have jointly protested anti-Christian violence. Attacks have increased in the new year.

Since Indian independence, conversion to Christianity and Islam has been a cause of tension. Despite demands for legislation by radical Hindu nationalists for a ban on conversion to religions of "foreign origins," the constitutional right to choose and propagate a religion has been safeguarded. However, the courts have eroded this right. In 1977, the Supreme Court ruled that the constitutional right to *propagate religion* did not include the right to convert any person to one's *own religion*. While attempts to introduce a bill in the national parliament have failed, in the last five years some state governments have passed acts that outlaw conversion to Islam and Christianity from low-caste Hindu and tribal backgrounds, but they do not prohibit conversion to Hinduism.

Part of the ancient economic and religious system of Hinduism, known as the caste system, has been a dominant force of the socioeconomic life of India for more than two thousand years. A Hindu majority means that the caste system still plays an important part in Indian life, dividing the society according to a strict hierarchy. A majority of converts from Hinduism are outcasts who embrace Islam or Christianity as a way to escape the traditional religious sanctions imposed on them under the Hindu caste system. In November 1999, two hundred *dalit* families near New Delhi threatened to convert to Christianity unless the government reserved more slots for *dalits* in medical and engineering colleges. However, while conversion to Islam or Christianity is perceived by some as an emancipation from the bondage of Hinduism, many converts from a low-caste Hindu background, especially women, still suffer a certain degree of discrimination from their "high-caste" Christian and Muslim coreligionists.

Hindu rules ban *dalits* (formerly called "untouchables," and about 16 percent of the population) from entering the temples. Although, since independence, legal forms of affirmative action have been introduced, it is an open secret that

the great majority of low-caste Hindus in India still continue to be treated as *dalit*. In many parts of the country, it is socially unacceptable to allow low-caste Hindus to visit a Hindu temple or participate in a Hindu religious festival. In 1994, the national parliament was informed that between 1991 and 1993, more than sixty-two thousand cases of atrocities were registered against *dalit* and indigenous people. This, together with legal limitations on their right to convert, adds up to serious violations of religious liberty and creates a system akin to religious apartheid. If *dalits* convert to Christianity or Islam, they lose their eligibility for affirmative action programs, though not if they convert to Buddhism, Jainism, or Sikhism, as these faiths are legally regarded as subsets of Hinduism.

Along with constitutional guarantees of religious freedom and respect for the religious feelings of all, there are restrictions in the penal code intended to protect religion. These include injuring or defiling places of worship with intent to insult the religion of any class, disturbance of religious assemblies, and utterances intended to wound the religious feelings of others. These laws are being increasingly violated, often with the connivance of the authorities. The authorities have consistently failed to take action in the face of mob attacks on religious properties belonging to the minority groups. Despite a Supreme Court ruling in 1995 outlawing hate speech, many Hindu leaders and politicians continue to use antiminority propaganda (particularly against Muslims and Christians) for political gain with virtual impunity. Government figures have denounced those who report on religious violence. Undoubtedly, the ineffectiveness of the judicial system is compounded by the certain degree of independence exercised by some state governments ruled by Hindu groups. For example, in 1998, the Shiv Sena government of Maharashtra decided to disband the National Commission for Minorities, which had been set up to investigate cases of violence against minorities.

While the vernacular press has always been biased against the minorities, the English press has historically had the reputation of being fairly balanced toward all religious communities. With the rise of Hindu nationalism, this has changed, and some leading Hindu intellectuals and journalists, such as Arun Shoorie, have shown increasing sympathy for the cause of fundamentalist Hindu nationalism. While constitutional and legal provisions to safeguard religious freedom remain, the rise of Hindu nationalism and Hindu militancy, along with measures to increase public order, have seriously threatened those tenets.



North Korea

Population	22.2 million
Atheist	68%
Ch'ondogyo	15%
Other Traditional	14%
Buddhist	2%
Christian	1%
Religious Freedom Rating	7

Documenting human rights abuses in North Korea is extraordinarily difficult because it is one of the most closed places in the world. The few Westerners permitted into the country are largely confined to the Pyongyang area, where they are carefully supervised. The government's extremely tight security makes defections of North Korean citizens rare. As a result, little is known about the full extent of religious persecution and the extent of underground activity. The statistics used above reflect this uncertainty. What can be said unequivocally is that, as the U.S. State Department asserted, "genuine religious freedom does not exist."

When Kim II-sung took power, he began a systematic campaign of indoctrination in his own Stalinist ideology, in which religion had no place. Today, virtually all outward vestiges of religion have been wiped out, and North Korea is regarded as the most hard-line atheistic nation in the world. The government relies on relentless propaganda and a comprehensive surveillance system to control virtually every act, belief, and desire of its citizens. North Koreans are prohibited from making even the slightest deviation from the Communist Party's rigid ideology.

Kim considered religion to be "superstition" and "a hindrance to the socialist revolution." By the early 1960s, his secret police had begun an intense effort against religious believers. All temples, shrines, churches, and other religious sites were closed, and all religious literature and Bibles were destroyed. Religious leaders were either executed or sent to concentration camps.

In place of Buddhism, Christianity and other religions, Kim imposed an alternative religion, a personality cult built around himself and his son. From early childhood, North Koreans were taught to look on the "Great Leader" Kim II-sung, and now Kim Jong-il, as infallible, godlike beings and the progenitors of the Korean race. The practice continues to the present, long after Kim II-sung's death.

The government allows and controls three religious organizations: the Buddhist Federation, the Korean Christian Federation, and the Korean Catholic Association. The Buddhist Federation says that there are about four hundred thousand Buddhists, the Protestant Federation claims to have ten thousand members, and the Catholic Association claims about three thousand members. Ch'ondogyo, a traditional Korean religion taken over by the government through the Ch'ondogyo Youth Party, is said to have three million adherents. Another three million are said to practice other forms of traditional worship. Nearly 70 percent of the population is said by the government to be atheist.

Visitors report that some Buddhist temples are operating, and Buddhist practices are probably carried out in homes across North Korea. Although fifty years ago the North Korean capital city of Pyongyang was nicknamed "Asia's Jerusalem" because of the strong influence of Christianity and some two thousand churches dotted the northern countryside, since 1988, in the capital, only three Christian church buildings—two Protestant and one Catholic—have been erected by the government. They seem to be used solely to impress Western observers. No Catholic priests live in the country, so the sacraments cannot be administered

even in the showplace church. Foreign journalists who have attended services in the three churches reported that neither the congregants nor the national leader of the Protestant Federation could name the first three books of the Bible. Others who went unannounced to the churches on Easter Sunday found them locked and empty. Some foreign observers have even questioned whether Christianity still exists behind North Korea's tightly guarded frontiers, though recent reports indicate that there may be many thousands of North Korean Christians who continue to meet secretly in homes. They have almost no access to Bibles, religious literature, or teaching materials.

Christianity is perceived by authorities to be a dangerous threat, with the potential of undermining the Kim dynasty. Underground Christians have told foreign groups that if they are caught in possession of the Scriptures they fear being executed on the spot. Defectors report that Christians are given the heaviest work, the least amount of food, and the worst conditions in prison. Those caught praying in prison are beaten and tortured. A recent defector reports that she saw some Christians working in a foundry put to death with hot irons. Defectors also report that children and grandchildren of Christians also face life imprisonment for the religious beliefs and activities of their forebears. There were reports at the end of 1999 and the beginning of 2000 that up to twenty-three converts to Christianity (some returning from China) had been executed by firing squad.



Sudan

Population	28.9 million
Sunni Muslim	70%
Christian	19%
Traditional	10%
Other/None	1%

Religious Freedom Rating 7

Sudan—Africa's largest country—is one of the world's worst religious persecutors. It practices forced conversion, represses those who do not subscribe to its version of Islam, has applied *shari'a* law to the entire population, enslaves its opponents, and is engaged in a war that the U.S. Congress, East African Bishops Conference, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, and many other observers have explicitly labeled "genocidal." Sudan's conflict broadly pits the country's Arab Muslim north against the black African Christian and animist south.

Egyptian Christians fled to Sudan during their persecution by the Romans in the first centuries. The churches in Sudan became firmly established in Nubia (northern Sudan) in the sixth century A.D., and Christianity was adopted by the inhabitants of the Nubian kingdoms of Muqurrah, Nobatia, and Alwah. Churches flourished along the Nile until the arrival of Muslim Arabs in the seventh century. The final collapse of the Alwah kingdom in the 1500s saw the end of the predominantly Christian era. Christianity reemerged in 1848 with the arrival in the north of a group of Catholic

missionaries who then traveled south. The British Closed Districts Ordinance of 1936 restricted contact between northern and southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains. Christian missionaries were all channeled to the south.

In 1957 the missionary schools and institutions were nationalized. This left the church with only theological colleges, and these could not function properly since qualified teachers were denied the necessary visas to enter the country. In 1960, Fridays legally became a public holiday and day of rest for all, regardless of faith. The Missionary Society Act of 1962 legalized the expulsion of missionaries and placed curbs on their activities, particularly in the south. Huge numbers were expelled in the following years. Following this, many Islamic schools were established in the south, and Arabic replaced English as the medium of teaching. African languages were forbidden. Parents could no longer choose children's schools, and many were forced to send them to the local Islamic school. The same Act declared it illegal to baptize a child before age eighteen. The teaching of Islamic and Arabic history was given priority in all schools, and African, even Sudanese, history was discouraged. All Sudanese from the south who applied to study secular law were made to sit for an Islamic law exam in order to be admitted to the law faculty. It is reported that, during the Anya Nya wars of the 1960s and early '70s, Christian African Sudanese were slaughtered by the hundreds. Pastors and other leaders were specifically targeted.

Shari'a law was imposed in 1983 and was made applicable to southerners and northerners alike. The Sudan Charter of 1987 stated that the Muslim community was the majority one within Sudan. (While religious statistics for all countries must be treated with care, in the case of Sudan this is even more so because much of the country is a war zone and there has been no census for decades. Muslims appear to be about 70 percent of the population, but Christianity is growing rapidly in the south where animist views were formerly dominant.) It also gave personal, social, and family autonomy to non-Muslims. However, while a Muslim man may marry a non-Muslim woman, a non-Muslim man may not marry a Muslim woman. Similarly, Muslims may adopt a child of any background, whereas non-Muslims are forbidden to adopt a child whose parents were Muslims or where the child was abandoned.

The 1992 National Assembly issued a document setting out fundamental rights, including a statement of respect for all "heavenly revealed religions and sacred beliefs" and prohibiting religious intolerance. Sudan's Constitutional Decree No. 7 (1993) affirms that Islam is the guiding religion for the overwhelming majority of the Sudanese people but accepts the adoption and practice of other faiths. Article 24 of the draft constitution of 1998 accords to all the freedom of creed, worship, education, practice of ceremonies, and choice of religion. However, it is still widely held that the practice of religions other than Islam is perceived as more a privilege than a right. A new dress code was imposed on women in January 1999, requiring them to wear Islamic attire and a head scarf, irrespective of faith. Even before this, Christian women and others had been detained and whipped for not dressing according to Islamic custom.

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In January 1995, Pierre Sane, Secretary General of Amnesty International, said the regime had "embarked on an armed crusade to mould its society into its own version of a radical Islamist agenda." Others have described the regime as a missionary one seeking to Islamize not only Sudan but also the whole of Africa. There are numerous calls to *jihad* against the south by government figures including Turabi and Vice President Osman Taha as well as regularly televised war footage accompanied by a stirring call to the holy struggle against the south. Nevertheless the majority of Sudanese Muslims do not share the regime's view of Islam.

The war methods adopted by the government include the bombing of civilian targets, a scorched-earth policy, looting of cattle, destruction of property, fueling of inter-ethnic and factional fighting, the arming of militias, and encouraging the taking of slaves as booty by these militias. Firsthand accounts of raids note the specific targeting of churches. The government has engaged in calculated starvation by vetoing international flights, a tactic that in 1998 brought 2.6 million to the brink of starvation. The United Nations umbrella group for delivering international relief, "Operation Lifeline Sudan," has been criticized by human rights groups for abiding by Khartoum's veto.

Islamization is accompanied by an equal drive toward Arabization. Many women from the south in the relocation camps have been raped or forced to marry soldiers. The macabre slave trade, which reemerged in Sudan in the mid-1980s, now involves several tens of thousands of individuals, mostly women and children. Many women are raped by their "owners" and the children brought up as Muslims, given Islamic names, taught Arabic, forced to say the salat (five daily prayers), and given a Quranic education. This process destroys the ethnic and religious identity of the south.

The government's prosecution of the war was intensified in late 1999 after oil developed by the regime in partnership with Canadian, Chinese, and other foreign companies came onstream in mid-1999. The oilfields, located in the south, were subject to a scorched-earth campaign by the government in late 1999 and were the scene of many atrocities. The oil has brought substantial revenues and new international contacts for the formerly bankrupt regime.

The Lord's Resistance Army, a rebel group operating in Uganda and funded by the Sudanese government, is notorious for the abduction of civilians and children. It has been

fighting since 1988 to overthrow President Museveni's secular government. UNICEF estimates that up to fifteen thousand children have been kidnapped in the past decade; many girls turned into sex slaves and boys brutalized, including being forced to drink the blood of weaker captives. In December 1999, Sudan signed an agreement with Uganda that it would stop supporting the LRA and Uganda would cease to support the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA).

Churches in the north are badly overcrowded because of the government's systematic refusal of applications for repairs or new buildings. This accentuates the shortages created by the demolition or confiscation of existing buildings. However, mosques and Islamic centers are freely constructed.

Church buildings are destroyed in government-held towns on the pretext that land is needed for houses and roads. However, in the same clearances mosques can be left untouched. On January 8, 1997, three churches at Thoura were razed. In December 1997, the Catholic Club (a study and recreation center for members of the Catholic church) was confiscated and subsequently occupied by the Sudan security. The influx of refugees from the south has led to new churches being established, and churches, albeit makeshift operations, do exist in many of the camps. Christians are also allowed access to prisons to pray with Christian prisoners. Government sources claim that the Catholic Church is still a major landowner in Khartoum and is free to operate unhindered. Christmas and Easter are recognized as public holidays. Muslims are given one day's holiday on December 25 in contrast to the three given to Christians. At Easter, only Christians are granted a public holiday.

A number of Christian schools operate in the north. They are primarily Roman Catholic, although evangelicals operate some. The Catholic schools (Comboni order) provide a high quality education, attracting Muslims and Christians, predominantly those from the south and Nuba Mountains. Arabic is a prerequisite for access to higher education. In the south a whole generation has been denied education as a result of the war. The church continues to try to take the lead in promoting and organizing whatever education it can.

In 1994, the present government repealed the 1962 Missionary Societies Act, which had obliged missionary groups to obtain an annual license for their activities. Many Christian groups work unhindered in Sudan, and evangelistic events, including a large rally, have been held without problems. Christian marches have also been authorized, and the police have assisted by clearing the road of vehicles. Missionaries cannot work openly, and individuals have been detained in this connection. Reports suggest that others working farther south have been forcibly deported. In 1992, missionaries were expelled from South Kordofan while the mass arrests and torture of local priests and catechists were carried out. Tight limitations are placed upon church relief efforts in the north, in contrast to the privileges enjoyed by Islamic relief organizations.

Individual Christians and Muslims have been targeted by the regime in incidents that clearly relate to their beliefs. Some individuals are routinely required to report to the security forces, and most clergy face travel restrictions.

Roman Catholic Archbishop Gabriel Wako is frequently harassed by the authorities with complaints ranging from importing communion wine and hymn-books to going outside Khartoum to visit his "flock." In July 1993, the Anglican Bishop, the Rt. Rev. Peter El Birish was publicly flogged for the alleged crime of adultery. Observers suggest that charges against both clergymen were contrived. Catholic Chancellor of the Archdiocese of Khartoum, Father Hilary Boma, and his colleague Father Lino Sebit were detained in late July and early August 1989 and charged with various offences relating to a bombing attack in the capital in June 1989. More than twenty others were also detained, three of whom died of torture. It is believed that Father Boma "confessed" to the crime after seeing Father Sebit tortured. They were released in December 1999 after refusing a pardon. Other priests are believed to have been detained and tortured for their faith in prison, including some in government-held towns in the south.

Coptic Orthodox Christians, who can be found predominantly in the north, number under two hundred thousand. Following the introduction of *shari'a* law in 1983, the Copts, though not subject to the worst excesses of the new law, found their status as court witnesses reduced. Many joined a "Christian Alliance" to defend Christians and encourage secular candidates. This led to a concerted effort to encourage the Copts to leave the country. After 1989, hundreds of Copts were dismissed from the civil service and the judiciary, and their previous ease of access to Sudanese nationality was undermined. Compulsory conscription has forced many to fight against fellow Christians in the south. In one case a Coptic child was flogged for failing to recite a Quranic verse. Many Coptic businessmen have fled the country as a result of more subtle harassment, such as access to licenses and inspections of properties followed by fines and/or closure of businesses on spurious grounds.

In February 1999, an exhibition put on by the Association of Christian Students at the University of Khartoum was attacked and destroyed. Following this incident, the Omdurman Islamic University Student Union issued a statement referring to "the suspicious movement of Christianity in Sudan" and called for stricter controls on Christian missionary work and church land and property. Threats of violence against Christians in other universities ensued.

Reports abound of incidents in which those in the so-called peace camps in the north and the Nuba Mountains refusing to convert to Islam have been denied aid. In May 1995, the *UN Rapporteur* reported the execution of twelve civilians by Government of Sudan (GOS) soldiers at Lobonok because they refused to convert to Islam. Whole villages in the Nuba Mountains have been held for ransom by security forces and forced to reconvert to Islam. Christians and animists alike have been affected. Atrocities against the people of Nuba have also included the burning of a church with all the people inside and the extrajudicial killing of church pastors. Catholic Bishop Macram Gassis has been forced into exile for having testified about the atrocities in the Nuba.

Reports of persecution in areas held by the SPLA are rare but do occur. On one occasion in 1996, six missionaries

who complained to the SPLA about forced recruitment of children were detained and the priest beaten by a local SPLA military intelligence officer. More recently a number of chaplains have been appointed to the SPLA.

Apostasy from Islam is punishable by death under Section 126 of the Sudan Criminal Code. Although Turabi has allegedly stated that "if a Muslim wakes up in the morning and says that he doesn't believe any more, that's his business," his views are recognized as unorthodox, and the law still exists. In 1990, a Muslim imam who had converted to Christianity was tried and sentenced to six months in prison and dismissed from work. One of the most publicized recent cases was Ali-Faki Kuku Hassan, a former Muslim sheik who converted in 1995. He was imprisoned for fourteen months before being released following a stroke.

Not only Christians have faced this charge. In 1985, Muslim scholar Mahmoud Mohammed Taha was accused of apostasy and executed. He represented a modernist Islamist group that recognized the *shari'a* as a historical interpretation of the Qur'an and the Sunna, allowing change according to circumstances. Section 126 also refers to those who give up organized religion or profess to be agnostic or atheists. Members of the Communist Party, which has now been banned, have been identified as atheists and a number detained and tortured. The Muslims in the Nuba are perceived as disloyal to the regime and have been targeted on religious grounds by the military.

Despite constitutional guarantees of nondiscrimination, Christians experience marginalization in employment. This has caused many to flee to Egypt and beyond. Non-Muslims are theoretically excluded from high-level government office, the judiciary, and the military, but some do remain in such positions. Many southerners have fled the country because of conscription requirements, which would force them to fight against their own kin. Military training includes Islamic education, regardless of the conscript's religion. Some of those conscripted have been unaccompanied minors in the capital, and non-Muslim boys in other northern cities have been picked up in sweeps by the police, subjected to the regime's version of Islamic indoctrination, and forcibly inducted into the military. Christians face problems receiving social welfare despite the fact that the tax to fund this is levied on all regardless of faith. Severe limitations exist on the time given to Christian programs on radio and TV, and the media frequently scapegoat Christians and Jews in the same breath as the West for many of Sudan's economic, social, and political problems.

Several members of an influential Muslim religious brotherhood, the Ansar sect, were arrested in June 1999, on the eve of an important Muslim festival. Previous acts of violence against the sect had taken place in 1994 and 1997. In the latter attack, two people were killed and ten wounded when worshipers were attacked as they left a mosque. The Sudan Human Rights Organization has reported that, in April 1998, more than seventy-four children were gunned down by the NIF military as they attempted to leave a conscription camp to spend time with their families on the occasion of the Muslim Eid festival. □

A Forgotten Hero of Liberal Education

There should perhaps be a special place of honor for those whose ideas are distorted or caricatured or derisively categorized, who come to the public square expecting a fair fight, only to find that their opponents have taken up the easy weapons of name-calling and labeling. The Hall of Fame for the Unjustly Maligned, we could call it. In the last issue of this magazine, we paid tribute to one such person—Jeanne Chall. Some thought they could shake Professor Chall from her pathbreaking work in reading research by dubbing her “reactionary” and “right-wing.” They were wrong, of course, both in their characterization and in their hope that it would scare her off. Now we look back a half century earlier, to another figure in the history of education who challenged prevailing wisdom, faced similar attack, and stood his ground.

—EDITOR

By Diane Ravitch

Some are heroes because of their physical courage. William Chandler Bagley (1874-1946) is an example of moral and intellectual courage. For more than three decades, he challenged popular educational fashions, risking the disdain of his peers. But the possibility of being ostracized never deterred him. By all accounts, he was always civil and reasonable when engaged in intellectual combat; he criticized ideas, not persons. Despite the significant role that he played, few educators today know his name; he is seldom mentioned in histories of American education. Yet historical retrospect suggests that he deserves recognition for his role as a dissenter and a voice of reason.



Bagley was born in Detroit in 1874. His parents were from Massachusetts and apparently moved a few times, because Bagley attended elementary school in Worcester, Massachusetts, and high school in Detroit. He graduated from the Michigan Agricultural College (later known as Michigan State College), where students were required to do farm work two and a half hours each weekday. His plans for a career in agricultural science were frustrated when he graduated in the midst of an economic depression in 1895; the only job he could find was teaching in a one-teacher school in rural Garth in the Upper Peninsula of Michigan. He was fascinated by both the challenge of the job and its lack of any scientific basis. He wrote to a friend that vastly

more was known “about the raising of pigs than about the minds of children.”

Determined to study the science of the mind, he earned a master’s degree at the University of Wisconsin in 1898 and a doctorate at Cornell University in 1900, both in psychology, which was then a new field of study. He earnestly believed that it was possible to develop a science of education, one that would be as precise and predictable as any of the physical sciences. In February 1901, he was hired as principal of

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an elementary school in St. Louis, and a few months later, he married a fellow student at Cornell, Florence MacLean Winger.

Because the climate in St. Louis was not good for his wife's health, he accepted an invitation in 1902 to teach psychology at the State Normal College in Dillon, Montana, and direct the training school. From 1903 to 1906, he also served as superintendent of the Dillon public schools, and in 1904 he became vice president of the college as well. In the midst of all these responsibilities, he published his first book, *The Educative Process* (1905) and founded *Intermountain Education*, the first school journal in the northern Rocky Mountain region.

In 1906, Bagley left Dillon to teach educational theory at the State Normal School in Oswego, New York, and to direct its training school. In 1907, he published *Classroom Management*, which remained in print for the next forty years. Based on the success of his books, he was offered several university professorships, and in 1909 he became a professor of education at the University of Illinois and director of the University's School of Education.

Bagley spent nine years building the faculty of the School of Education at the University of Illinois. He also published several books, was one of the founders of the *Journal of Educational Psychology*, founded a professional honor society for educators, and was president of the National Society for the Study of Education. Although deeply immersed in profession-building activities, Bagley always preferred to be addressed as "Mister Bagley" rather than "Doctor" or "Professor."

Bagley's early career offered no hint of his future role as a dissident. Admired by his peers as a leader in the field, he tirelessly advocated a sound education for future teachers, a proposition that no one disputed. Yet as early as 1907, in *Classroom Management*, he lamented "the waves of fads and reforms that sweep through the educational system at periodic intervals," and he worried about reformers who would "leave teacher and pupil to work out each his own salvation in the chaos of confusion and disorder."

Clearly Bagley was alarmed by the espousal of untested theories by his fellow professors of education. But he was not regarded as a controversialist until 1914, when he engaged in a celebrated debate with David Snedden, commissioner of education for Massachusetts, at the annual meeting of the National Education Association. Bagley was known as a genial teacher-educator; Snedden was a national leader in the vocational education movement, which was widely recognized as the leading edge of progressive reform. Snedden advocated the creation of separate vocational schools for the vast majority of adolescents.

Bagley defended liberal education for all children. He insisted that all young people should have access to the knowledge, skills, habits, and ideals that would equip them for changing situations, not just for a particular job. He contended that young people needed the historical perspective that would enable them to rise above local, sectional, or partisan points of view; the knowledge of science that would free them from superstition and error; and engagement in literature and art to enable them to understand human mo-

tives and conduct. To denigrate liberal education as a leisure activity for the few, as so many educators did, Bagley said, "is a sin against the children of the land, and it is a crime against posterity." Bagley claimed that the American people were dedicated to "the theory that talent is distributed fairly evenly among the masses and that it is the special prerogative of no especial class or group. . . . We mean to keep open the door of opportunity at every level of the educational ladder. It is a costly process, but so are most other things that are precious and worth while."

At the next annual meeting of the National Education Association in 1915, attended by more than three thousand educators, Bagley criticized the next progressive reform: the junior high school. The U.S. commissioner of education, Philander P. Claxton, maintained that the typical eight-year course should be reduced to six years, after which children as young as twelve could begin vocational and industrial training. When the leaders of the National Education Association endorsed a resolution in support of the junior high school, knowing that its purpose was to sort children into academic and vocational tracks, Bagley dissented: "Hitherto in our national life we have proceeded on the assumption that no one has the omniscience to pick out the future hewers of wood and drawers of water—at least not when the candidates for these tasks are to be selected at the tender age of twelve."

One positive result of Bagley's debate with Snedden was that he caught the attention of Dean James Russell of Teachers College, Columbia University, the nation's leading school of education. Russell reportedly said that Bagley should be representing Teachers College in such debates instead of fighting on the outside. In 1918, Bagley joined the faculty of Teachers College as head of the Department of Teacher Education. Having abandoned his earlier belief in the possibility of a science of education, Bagley was convinced that education is an art, dependent on an adequate supply of skillful, well-educated teachers. Most of the profession, however, endorsed the scientific movement in education, whose chief feature was mental testing.

World War I offered the mental testers a remarkable field for experimenting. Invited to help classify some 1.7 million recruits, leading psychologists developed group intelligence tests (IQ tests) to determine whether men were fit to be officers or infantry, or rejected. Prominent academic psychologists, including Robert Yerkes of Harvard, Carl Brigham of Princeton, Lewis Terman of Stanford, and Edward Thorndike of Teachers College, developed the army tests. The psychologists asserted that their instruments measured innate intelligence, which they proclaimed was fixed and unchanging. After the war, Yerkes and Brigham reported that the average mental age of Americans was only about thirteen or fourteen and that the continued influx of non-Nordic groups from Europe threatened the nation's future because of their low IQs. Their claims provided fodder in the 1920s for nativists, racists, and eugenicists, as well as for efforts to restrict immigration from southern and eastern Europe.

Only two men responded forcefully to the intelligence testers. One was Walter Lippmann, whose blistering attacks

Bagley's continuing insistence that all children should have access to a liberal education, regardless of their IQ, branded him as a reactionary, hopelessly behind the times.

appeared in the *New Republic*. The other was William Chandler Bagley. The overwhelming majority of educators endorsed intelligence tests, but Bagley warned that they posed grave "educational and social dangers." He rejected the testers' assumption that intelligence is innate and unchanging; whatever they measured, he asserted, could well be the result of environment and education. He predicted that IQ tests would be used to slam the doors of educational opportunity on large numbers of children.

Bagley feared that the IQ test, cloaked in the neutral but impressive language of science, would be an instrument of social stratification, threatening democracy itself. He insisted that the army test results actually proved the importance of environment and educational opportunity. He pointed out, for example, that many northern blacks scored higher than many southern whites and that the scores of immigrants increased in relation to their length of residency in this country.

Bagley summarized his charges against the testers and the misuse of IQ tests in *Determinism in Education* (1925). He argued that the role of schools in a democracy is not to sort students for their future careers but to improve the intelligence of everyone who comes to be educated. He wrote:

I make no absurd claim that if I teach a common man the principle of gravitation, let us say, I am making the common man equal to Newton. . . . I do maintain that I have enabled this common man to participate in a very real measure in the experiences of one of the most gifted men of all time; I maintain that I have given him one control over his environment equal in a substantial way to that which this gifted man himself pos-

sessed; and I maintain that *in respect of this possession* I have made this common man the equal of all others who possess it. There are undoubtedly some men who could never grasp the principle in question, but I should wish to refine my teaching processes far more . . . before reaching any fatalistic conclusions as to where the line is to be drawn.

As in his earlier critique of vocational education, Bagley insisted that education is powerful and that virtually everyone could become better informed and more intelligent if education aimed to make them so. His complaint against the tests was not that they were invalid but that they would be used to restrict educational opportunity to those who needed it most.

Bagley was again out of step with the field, and his arguments were ignored. Intelligence testing spread rapidly among the nation's schools and was accepted as a reliable instrument to sort children into different curricular tracks, affording different educational opportunities.

Because of his defense of liberal education in 1914 and his attack on intelligence testing in the 1920s, Bagley got a reputation among his fellow educationists as a conservative who was opposed to progressive education and hostile to modern, scientific education. His continuing insistence that all children should have access to a liberal education, regardless of their IQ, branded him as a reactionary, hopelessly behind the times.

In the 1930s, when progressive educators like Harold Rugg and William Kilpatrick—Bagley's colleagues at Teachers College—led a national movement to promote classroom methods based on children's interests instead of subject matter, Bagley was their leading critic. Kilpatrick believed that curriculum should not be set out in advance and that children were best motivated if they learned through activities that interested them; his idea, christened the "activity movement," was the hottest idea in education in the 1930s. Rugg's 1928 book, *The Child-Centered School* (co-authored with Ann Shumaker), described schools using Kilpatrick's methods as makers of an "Educational Revolution" that would free American society from Puritanism and authoritarianism.

In his last major book, *Education and Emergent Man* (1934), Bagley took issue with the central doctrines of progressive education, especially its claim that the only knowledge of value was instrumental and useful. Bagley contended that although knowledge for immediate use is important, so is knowledge for understanding and interpretation. Only a fraction of what one needs to know, he maintained, can be learned by participating in activities and solving problems; a broadly educated person also needs a large fund of background knowledge drawn from the systematic and sequential study of history, geography, science, mathematics, literature, and the arts. He did not reject the progressives' preference for activities, but he did reject their contempt for organized subject matter.

Bagley insisted on a necessary balance between interest and effort. Not everything in the classroom, he argued, should be fun and interesting; such an appeal taught students to respond only to pleasure and self-gratification in-

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